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procedure to aggregate the heterogeneous beliefs in not only risk preferences and
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thatthemarketaggregate behaviorisinprincipleaweightedaverageofheterogeneous
individual behaviors. The CAPM-like equilibrium price and return relationships un-
der heterogeneous beliefs are obtained. The impact of diversity of heterogeneous
beliefs on the market aggregate risk preference, asset volatility, equilibrium price and
optimal demands of investors is examined. As a special case, our result provides a
simple explanation for the empirical relation between cross-sectional volatility and
expected returns.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin (Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), Mossin (1966)) Capi-
tal Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) plays a central role in modern ﬁnance theory. It is
founded on the paradigm of homogeneous beliefs and a rational representative agent.
However, from the theoretical perspective this paradigm has been criticized on a num-
ber of grounds, in particular concerning its extreme assumptions about homogeneous
beliefs and information of the economic environment and computational ability on the
part of the rational representative economic agent. Within the standard mean-variance
framework, this paper seeks to introduce heterogeneous beliefs in risk preferences,
means and variances/covariances among agents, to analyze the aggregation properties
of their heterogeneous beliefs, to examine the impact of the heterogeneity of beliefs
on asset equilibrium price, and to establish a CAPM-like relationship under heteroge-
neous beliefs.
The impact of heterogeneous beliefs among agents on the market equilibrium price
has been an important focus in the literature. It has been found that heterogeneous
beliefs can affect aggregate markets returns. Models with agents who have heteroge-
neous beliefs have been previously studied (see, for example, Lintner (1969), Williams
(1977), Huang and Litzenberger (1988), Abel (1989), Detemple and Murthy (1994),
Zapatero (1998) and Basak (2000)). In much of these earlier work, the heterogeneous
beliefs reﬂect either differences of opinion among the agents (see, for example, Lintner
(1969), Miller (1977), Mayshar (1982), Varian (1985), Abel (1989, 2002), Cecchetti et
al. (2000)) or differences in information upon which agents are trying to learn by us-
ing Bayesian updating rule (see, for example, Williams (1977), Detemple and Murthy
(1994), Zapatero (1998)). Heterogeneity has been investigated in the context of either
CAPM-like mean-variance models (see, for example Lintner (1969), Miller (1977),
Williams (1977) and Mayshar (1982)) or an Arrow-Debreu contingent claims models
(see, for example, Varian (1985), Abel (1989, 2002), Calvet et al. (2004) and Jouini
and Napp (2006)).
In most of this literature, the impact of heterogeneous belief is studied for a portfolio
of one risky asset and one risk-free asset (e.g. Abel (1989), Basak (2000), Zapatero
(1998) and Johnson (2004)). In those papers that consider a portfolio of many risky
assets and one risk-free asset, agents are assumed to be heterogeneous in the risk pref-
erences and expected payoffs or returns of risky assets (e.g. Williams (1977), Varian
(1985) and Jouini and Napp (2006)), but not in the variances and covariances. The
only exception seems to have been the contribution of Lintner (1969) in which the het-
erogeneity in both means and variances/covariances is investigated in a mean-variance
portfolio context. Variation of dispersion in the expected payoffs of risky assets among
investors can be characterized by heterogeneous beliefs about the variance/covariance
among investors. However, the impact of such heterogeneity has not been fully ex-
plored in the literature, including the contribution of Lintner (1969). Miller (1977)
proposes a direct relationship between a stock’s risk and its divergence of opinion.
Variation in expectations among potential investors is characterized as the stock’s di-
vergence of opinion. He argue that “in practice, uncertainty, divergence of opinion
about a security’s return, and risk go together”. Consequently, he proposed that “the
riskiest stocks are also those about which there is the greatest divergence of opinion”,
thus, the market clearing price of a relatively high-risk stock will be greater than that
for a relatively low-risk stock. The early empirical study by Bart and Masse (1981)
supports Miller’s proposition. Recently, Diether et al. (2002) provide empirical evi-
dence that stocks with higher dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts earn lower fu-
ture returns than otherwise similar stocks, in particular for small stocks and stocks thatAGGREGATION OF HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS AND ASSET PRICING THEORY 3
have performed poorly over the past year. This is inconsistent with a view that disper-
sion in analysts’ forecasts proxies for risk. Johnson (2004) offers a simple explanation
for this phenomenon based on the interpretation of dispersion as a proxy for un-priced
informationriskarisingwhenassetvaluesareunobservable. Angetal. (2006)examine
the relation between cross-sectional volatility and expected returns and ﬁnd that stocks
with high sensitivities to innovations in aggregate volatility have low average returns.
As suggested by the empirical study in Chan et al. (1999), while future variances and
covariances are more easily predictable than expected future returns, the difﬁculties
should not be understated. They argue that “While optimization (based on historical
estimates of variances and covariances) leads to a reduction in volatility, the problem
of forecasting covariance poses a challenge”. Therefore, understanding the impact of
heterogeneous beliefs in variances and covariances on equilibrium prices, volatility
and cross-sectional expected returns is very important for a proper development of as-
set pricing theory. This paper is largely motivated by a re-reading of Lintner’s early
work and the recent empirical studies.
In this paper, we consider a portfolio of one risk-free asset and many risky assets and
extend the mean-variance model to allow for heterogeneity in not only the means but
also the variances/covariances across agents. The heterogeneous beliefs are considered
as given. They reﬂect either differences of opinion among the agents or differences in
information. By introducing the concept of a consensus belief, we ﬁrst show that the
consensus belief can be constructed as a weighted average of the heterogeneous be-
liefs and prove that the analysis of the heterogeneous beliefs model is equivalent to the
analysis of a classical homogeneous model with the consensus belief. In particular, we
show that the market aggregate expected payoffs of the risky assets can be measured
by a weighted average of the heterogeneous expected payoffs of the risky assets across
the agents, in which the weights are given by the heterogeneous covariance matrices
adjusted by the risk aversion coefﬁcients of the agents. We then examine various ag-
gregation properties, including the impact of heterogeneity on the market equilibrium
price, volatility, risk premium and agents’ optimal demands in equilibrium. We show
that the market equilibrium price is a weighted average of the equilibrium prices under
the heterogeneous beliefs. We also establish an equilibrium relation between the mar-
ket aggregate expected payoff of the risky assets and the market portfolio’s expected
payoff, leading to a CAPM-like relation under heterogeneous beliefs. An exact for-
mula for the β coefﬁcient under heterogeneous beliefs is derived. Consequently, the
standard CAPM in return under homogeneous belief is extended to the one under het-
erogeneous beliefs. As a special case, our result provides a simple explanation for the
empirical relation between cross-sectional volatility and expected returns.
An example of two risky assets and two heterogeneous beliefs is used to illustrate
variousimpactsofheterogeneousbeliefsontheequilibriumdemandsofheterogeneous
agents, theequilibriumreturnsoftheriskyassetsandthemarketportfolio. Inparticular
we examine the impact of the heterogeneous beliefs on the β coefﬁcient.
The paper is organized as follows. Heterogeneous beliefs are introduced and the
standard mean-variance analysis is conducted in Section 2. In Section 3, we ﬁrst intro-
duce a consensus belief, and show how the consensus belief can be constructed from
heterogeneous beliefs. We then derive the market equilibrium price of risky assets
based on the consensus belief. Aggregation properties and the impact of diversiﬁed
beliefs are examined in Section 4. In Section 5, we extend the traditional CAMP un-
der homogeneous belief to the one under heterogeneous beliefs. An example of two
agents and two beliefs is presented in Section 6 to illustrate the different impact of
heterogeneity on the equilibrium optimal demands, returns of risky assets and market
portfolio, and the corresponding β coefﬁcients. Section 7 concludes.4 CHIARELLA, DIECI AND HE
2. MEAN-VARIANCE ANALYSIS UNDER HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS
The static mean-variance model considered in this section is standard except that
we allow the agents to have different risk preference, subjective means, variances and
covariances. Consider a market with one risk-free asset and K(≥ 1) risky assets.
Let the current price of the risk-free asset be 1 and its payoff be Rf = 1 + rf. Let
˜ x = (˜ x1,··· , ˜ xK)T be the payoff vector of the risky assets, where ˜ xk = ˜ pk + ˜ dk
corresponds to the cum-prices.
Assume that there are I investors in the market indexed by i = 1,2,··· ,I. The
heterogeneous (subjective) belief Bi = (Ei(˜ x),Ωi) of investor i is deﬁned with respect
to the means, variances and covariances of the payoffs of the assets
1
yi = Ei(˜ x) = (yi,1,yi,2,··· ,yi,K)
T, Ωi = (σi,kl)K×K,
where
yi,k = Ei[˜ xk], σi,kl = Covi(˜ xk, ˜ xl) (2.1)
for i = 1,2,···I and k,l = 1,2,··· ,K.
Let zi,o and ¯ zi,o be the absolute amount and the endowment of investor i in the risk-
free asset, respectively, and
zi = (zi,1,zi,2,··· ,zi,K)
T and ¯ zi = (¯ zi,1, ¯ zi,2,··· , ¯ zi,K)
T
be the risky portfolio and the endowment, respectively, of investor i in absolute amount
of the risky assets. Then the end-of-period wealth of the portfolio for investor i is
˜ Wi = Rfzio + ˜ x
Tzi.
Then, under the belief Bi, the expected value and variance of portfolio wealth ˜ Wi are
given, respectively, by




i( ˜ Wi) = z
T
i Ωizi. (2.2)
We now make the following standard assumptions under the mean-variance frame-
work.
(H1) Assume the expected utility of the wealth generated from the portfolio (zi,o,zi)
of investor i has the form Vi(Ei( ˜ Wi),σ2
i( ˜ Wi)), where Vi(x,y) is continuously
differentiable and satisﬁes Vi1(x,y) = ∂Vi(x,y)/∂x > 0 and Vi2(x,y) =
∂Vi(x,y)/∂y < 0.





Assumption (H1) is in particular consistent with the constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA) utility function Ui(w) = −e−Aiw with normally distributed w. Here Ai > 0
corresponds to the CARA coefﬁcient. In this case, investor-i’s optimal investment
portfolio is obtained by maximizing the certainty-equivalent of his/her future wealth,
Ci( ˜ Wi) = Ei( ˜ Wi)−
Ai
2 V ari( ˜ Wi), and therefore Vi(x,y) = x−
Ai
2 y. Under assumption
(H2), θi = Ai, which is the absolute risk aversion of investor i. Based on this, we refer
θi as the risk aversion measure of investor i.
Under (H1), the optimal portfolio of investor-i of risky assets z∗
i and risk-free asset
z∗






1The heterogeneity considered in this paper is quite general. It may be due to the heterogeneous prob-
ability beliefs in an Arrow-Debreu economy, or heterogeneous information, or differences of opinion
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subject to the budget constraint
zi,o + p
T
o zi = ¯ zi,o + p
T
o ¯ zi, (2.3)
where po = (p1o,p2o,··· ,pKo)T is the vector of market equilibrium prices of the risky
assets, which is to be determined. We can then obtain the following Lemma 2.1 for the
optimal demand of investor i in equilibrium.
Lemma 2.1. Under assumptions (H1) and (H2), the optimal risky portfolio z∗
i of in-







i [yi − Rfpo]. (2.4)
Proof. Let λi be the Lagrange multiplier and set
L(zi,o,zi,λi) := Vi(Ei( ˜ Wi),σ
2
i( ˜ Wi)) + λi[(¯ zi,o + p
T
o ¯ zi) − (zi,o + p
T
o zi)].











= λipko, k = 1,2,··· ,K. (2.6)













for k = 1,2,··· ,K. Then (2.5) and (2.6) become




σi,klzi,l = λipko, k = 1,2,··· ,K. (2.8)
Substituting (2.7) into (2.8) leads to
Vi1[yi,k − Rfpko] + 2Vi2
K X
l=1
σi,klzi,l = 0, k = 1,2,··· ,K, (2.9)
which in matrix notation can be written as
Vi1[yi − Rfpo] + 2Vi2Ωizi = 0.
This, together with assumption (H2), leads to the optimal portfolio (2.4) of investor i
at the market equilibrium. ￿
Lemma 2.1 shows that the optimal demand of investor-i is determined by his/her
risk aversion θi and his/her belief about the expected payoffs and variance/covariance
matrix of the risky assets’ payoffs. We will see that, in the market equilibrium, the
optimal demand depends on the dispersion of expected payoffs of investor-i from the
market.6 CHIARELLA, DIECI AND HE
3. CONSENSUS BELIEF AND EQUILIBRIUM ASSET PRICES
In this section, we ﬁrst deﬁne a consensus belief. By construction, we show the
existence and uniqueness of the consensus belief. The market equilibrium prices of
risky assets are then derived by using the consensus belief.
A market equilibrium is a vector of asset prices po determined by the individual








¯ zi = zm, (3.1)
which deﬁnes a market portfolio. To characterize the market equilibrium, we intro-
duce the following deﬁnition of consensus belief.
Deﬁnition 3.1. A belief Ba = (Ea(˜ x),Ωa), deﬁned by the expected payoff of the risky
assets Ea(˜ x) and the variance and covariance matrix of the risky asset payoffs Ωa, is
called a consensus belief if and only if the equilibrium price under the heterogeneous
beliefs is also the equilibrium price under the homogeneous belief Ba.
We now show how such a consensus belief can be uniquely constructed and how the
market equilibrium price can be characterized by the consensus belief.
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a [Ea(˜ x) − Rfpo]. (3.7)
This leads to the market equilibrium price (3.4). Inserting (3.4) into the optimal de-
mandfunctionofinvestor-iin(2.4)weobtaintheequilibriumdemand(3.5)ofinvestor-
i for the risky assets. The uniqueness of the consensus belief follows from the unique-
ness of the equilibrium price and the construction. ￿
Proposition 3.2 shows not only the existence of the unique consensus belief but also
how it can be constructed from heterogeneous beliefs. The equilibrium asset pricing
formula is the standard one under the consensus belief. As one of the main results of
this paper, the implications of Proposition 3.2 are explored in the following section.
4. AGGREGATION PROPERTIES AND IMPACT OF HETEROGENEITY IN BELIEFS
In this paper, heterogeneity is characterized by the diversity in risk aversion coefﬁ-
cients, expected payoffs and variance/covariance matrices of the payoffs of the risky
assets. Understanding the impact of such diversity under market aggregation is im-
portant for a proper understanding of asset pricing theory. We examine the impact of
heterogeneity from several different perspectives.
4.1. The aggregation effect of diversity in risk aversion coefﬁcients. If we treat
θi as the absolute risk aversion coefﬁcient of investor-i, then the coefﬁcient Θ corre-
sponds to the harmonic mean of the absolute risk aversion of all the investors. The
aggregate property of the risk aversion coefﬁcient can be examined from two different
perspectives.









This implies that the aggregate risk aversion coefﬁcient Θ is smaller than the average
of the risk aversion coefﬁcients among investors.
Secondly, the aggregation property of the risk aversions can be characterized via
a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of the risk aversion coefﬁcients θi. The
mean-preservingspreadisastandardtechniquedevelopedinRothschild-Stiglitz(1970)
to measure the stochastic dominance among risky assets. We extend this technique to
examine the effect of the diversity of the risk aversions.
To illustrate, assume I = 2 and let the risk aversion coefﬁcients be {θ1,θ2}, with
θ1 < θ2. That is investor-2 is more risk averse than investor-1. Deﬁne θ := (θ1+θ2)/2












i=1 αif(xi) holds for αi > 0
satisfying
Pn
i=1 αi = 1. The equality holds if and only if all xi are the same.8 CHIARELLA, DIECI AND HE
Assume now that the risk aversion coefﬁcients change into the following {θ′
1,θ′
2} =
{θ1 − ε,θ2 + ε} with θ1 ≥ ε > 0, this represents a mean-preserving spread in the risk
aversion coefﬁcients and ǫ > 0 measure the dispersion of heterogeneous belief in the




(θ1 − ε)(θ2 + ε)
θ
Given that
(θ1 − ε)(θ2 + ε) = θ1θ2 − ε(θ2 − θ1) − ε
2 < θ1θ2,
it turns out that Θ′ < Θ. This implies that diversity of a mean-preserving spread in
risk-aversion coefﬁcients can reduce the risk aversion coefﬁcient under aggregation.
In particular, if ǫ is very close to θ1, the aggregate risk aversion Θ′ is very close to 0,
and hence the market is close to a risk-neutral market.
The above analysis indicates that aggregation of diversiﬁed risk preferences among
heterogeneous agents makes the market become less risk averse.
4.2. The aggregation effect of diversity in variances and covariances. It follows
from(3.2)thattheinverseoftheaggregatecovariancematrixisarisk-adjustedweighted
average (with weights Θ/(Iθi)) of the inverse of the covariance matrices of the hetero-
geneous investors.
To investigate the aggregation property of the variance and covariance, we ﬁrst com-
pare the variances of any portfolio under both the aggregate covariance matrix and
average of the heterogeneous covariance matrices. More precisely, we use both the










TΩaz, σ2(z) = z
T ¯ Ωz.
It would be interesting to know if and under what conditions σ2
a(z) ≤ σ2(z).
Numerical simulations show that this is not true in general, however, this result is
true when the payoffs of different assets are uncorrelated. As a matter of a fact, in this





























i,j = ¯ σ
2
j. (4.3)
Hence, when asset payoffs are uncorrelated, the variance of any portfolio under the
aggregate variance is smaller than that under the weighted average variance.
Similarly to the discussion in Section 4.1, it is interesting to examine the effect of
diversity in variance/covariance beliefs. The effect is not clear in general. We only
consider the case when asset payoffs are uncorrelated. In this case, when the beliefs
about the risk aversion coefﬁcients are homogeneous (i.e. θi = θ for all i), σ2
a,j is a
harmonic mean of the variance beliefs. Applying the same argument as in Section 4.1,
we can conclude that a mean-preserving spread in variance beliefs can reduce the asset
risk under aggregation. However, this result is also true under certain conditions when
the beliefs about the risk aversion coefﬁcients are heterogeneous. This is illustrated by
the following example.AGGREGATION OF HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS AND ASSET PRICING THEORY 9
Example. Let I = 2 and the risk aversion coefﬁcients be θ1,θ2. Assume the payoffs













as the weighted average variance. In this particular case (σ2


















































1,j > ε > 0, δ = εθ1/θ2,
this is a mean-preserving spread in variance beliefs. The weighted average variance is
again σ2





























Condition (4.4) implies that, on the one hand, a mean-preserving spread in variance
beliefs reduces the aggregate market risk of the risky asset when an investor (here
investor-2) who believes the asset is more risky (measured by higher σ2,j) is more risk
averse (in the sense of (4.4)). On the other hand, a mean-preserving spread in variance
beliefs increases the aggregate market risk of the risky asset when an investor (here
investor-2) who believes the asset is more risky is less risk averse.
By assuming that investors are risk averse, we can use the above example to explain
the empirical relation between cross-sectional volatility and expected returns reported
by Diether et al. (2002) and Ang et al. (2006). They found empirical evidence that
stocks with higher dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts earn lower future returns
than otherwise similar stocks. Assume that both investors in the above example have
homogeneous beliefs about are expected payoffs of risky assets j and j′ but heteroge-
neous about risk aversion coefﬁcients and variances of the assets. We also assume the
variance beliefs for asset j′ is a mean-preserving spread of variance beliefs for asset
j. If investor-2 is more risk averse than investor-1 (in the sense of condition (4.4)),
then it follows from the example that the aggregate variance of asset j′ is less than that
of asset j. Thus, from the equilibrium price equation (3.4), the equilibrium price for
asset j′ is higher than the equilibrium price for asset j. This in turn implies that asset
j′ has lower expected return than asset j. In other word, stocks with higher dispersion
in expected payoffs have higher market clearing prices and earn lower future expected
returns than otherwise similar stocks. This result is consistent with Miller’s proposi-
tion that divergence of opinion and risk “go together”. It is also interesting to see that
this kind of argument cannot hold when investors have homogeneous beliefs.10 CHIARELLA, DIECI AND HE







i , equation (3.3) indicates that the aggregate expected payoff of
risky assets under the consensus belief Ba is a weighted average of the heterogeneous
expectedpayoffsoftheriskyassets. Ontheonehand, ifinvestorsagreeontheexpected
payoff Ei(˜ x) = Eo(˜ x), then it follows from (3.3) that Ea(˜ x) = Eo(˜ x), although they
may disagree on their risk preferences, variances and covariances. On the other hand,










assets. In this case, the expected market payoff is dominated by investors who are less
(more) risk averse and believe in a higher (lower) expected payoff, as we would expect
in bull (bear) market, although such dominance may be asymmetric for bull and bear
markets. Otherwise, the aggregate expected payoff may be unchanged even if investors
have divergent opinions on their expected payoffs, as long as they are balanced.
Based on the above discussion, one can see that the aggregate payoff Ea(˜ x) is af-
fected by the covariance beliefs only when investors disagree on both the expected
payoffs and covariances. The impact of a mean-preserving spread in either risk aver-
sion coefﬁcients or variance matrices on the expected aggregate payoffs is less clear in
general and we leave an analysis of this issue to future research.
4.4. The impact of heterogeneity on the market equilibrium price. The market
equilibrium price (3.4) in Proposition 3.2 (ii) is exactly the same as the traditional
equilibrium price for a representative agent holding the consensus belief Ba. If we
deﬁne pi,o as the equilibrium price vector of the risky assets for investor i as if he/she




[Ei(˜ x) − θiΩi¯ zi].















equilibrium prices under his/her belief if he/she were the only agent in the market.
Consistent with Miller’s argument, the market price may reﬂect the expectations of
only the most optimistic minority, as long as this minority can absorb the entire supply
of stock.
Equation (3.4) indicates that the market equilibrium price depends on the aggregate
expected payoff Ea(˜ x) and the equity risk premium ΘΩazm/I. The equity risk pre-
mium is proportional to both the aggregate risk aversion coefﬁcient Θ and the covari-
ance between the risky assets and the average market portfolio Ωazm/I. The diversity
of heterogeneous beliefs in variances and covariance will affect the equity risk pre-
mium. In particular, a mean-preserving spread in variance beliefs when asset payoffs
are uncorrelated will reduces the aggregate variances of stocks, leading to a lower eq-
uity risk premium and therefore a higher market price. When both the risk aversion
coefﬁcients and the market portfolio are bounded (as is often the case), the equity risk
premium becomes smaller when the number of investors increases. In the limitingAGGREGATION OF HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS AND ASSET PRICING THEORY 11







Ea(˜ p + ˜ d). (4.7)
This is the traditional risk-neutral discount equity value formula under the expected
aggregate payoff of heterogeneous beliefs, which we see may be a reasonable approx-
imation in a market with heterogeneous beliefs if the number of different beliefs is
sufﬁcient large.
4.5. The impact of heterogeneity on the optimal demands and trading volume.
Proposition 3.2 (iii) indicates that the equilibrium demand of an individual investor has




i [Ei(˜ x) −Ea(˜ x)] corresponds to the standard
demand. It reﬂects the dispersion of the investor’s expected payoff from the aggregate
expected payoff. The second term (Θ/θi)Ω
−1
i Ωazm/I reﬂects the dispersion of the in-
vestor’s belief on variance and covariance from the aggregate variance and covariance.
When an investor’s expected payoff is the same as the aggregate expected payoff, that
is, Ei(˜ x) = Ea(˜ x), the investor’s demand is simply determined by the second com-
ponent. When investors are homogeneous in the risk aversion coefﬁcient θi = θo and
the covariance matrix Ωi = Ωo, the second component reduces to zm/I, which is the
average share of the market portfolio. In this case, the equilibrium demand of investor







o [Ei(˜ x) − Ea(˜ x)] + zm/I, (4.8)










From (4.8) and (4.9), one can see that a mean-preserving spread in the distribution
of the expected payoffs among investors will not change the equilibrium price, but
will spread optimal demands among investors around the average market portfolio,
this in turn will increase the trading volume in the market, assuming a uniform initial
endowment among investors. This implies that a high trading volume due to diversiﬁed
beliefs about asset expected payoffs may not necessarily lead to high volatility of asset
prices. If the expected payoff dispersion of investors from the average expected payoff
does not change, investors demands will not change. However a high average of the
expected payoffs will lead to a high market equilibrium asset price. This suggests that
a higher (or lower) market price due to a higher (or lower) averaged expected payoff
may not necessarily lead to high trading volume.
5. THE CAPM-LIKE RELATIONSHIP UNDER HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS
We now explore the impact of heterogeneity on the CAPM relationship, which con-
stitutes the second main set of results of this paper. For the market portfolio zm, its
value in the market equilibrium is given by Wm,o = zT
mpo and its future payoff is given
by ˜ Wm = ˜ xTzm. Hence, under the consensus belief Ba,
Wm = Ea( ˜ Wm) = Ea(˜ x)
Tzm, σ
2
m = V ar( ˜ Wm) = z
T
mΩazm. (5.1)
Based on Proposition 3.2 and the above observation, we obtain the following CAPM-
like price relation under heterogeneous beliefs. We shall call this relationship the Het-
erogeneous CAPM (HCAPM) in price.12 CHIARELLA, DIECI AND HE
Proposition 5.1. In equilibrium the market aggregate expected payoff of the risky as-
sets are related to the expected payoff of the market portfolio zm by the CAPM-like
price relation




Ωazm[Ea( ˜ Wm) − RfWm,o], (5.2)
or equivalently,
Ea(˜ xk) − Rfpk,o =
σ( ˜ Wm, ˜ xk)
σ2
m
[Ea( ˜ Wm) − RfWm,o], k = 1,2,··· ,K, (5.3)
whereΩa = (σkj)K×K andσ( ˜ Wm, ˜ xk) =
PK
j=1 zm,jσkj fork = 1,··· ,K corresponds
to the covariance of the market aggregate payoffs of the risky asset k and the aggregate
market portfolio payoff ˜ Wm.




−1[Ea( ˜ Wm) − RfWm,o]
and hence
Ea( ˜ Wm) − RfWm,o = Θσ
2
m/I. (5.4)
On the other hand, from (3.4),
Ea(˜ x) − Rfpo = ΘΩazm/I.
This last equation, together with (5.4), lead to the CAPM-like price relation (5.2) under
heterogeneous beliefs in a vector form. ￿
The HCAPM price relation (5.2) can be converted to the standard CAPM-like return
















With these notations, we can obtain from (5.2) the following HCAPM relation between
returns of risky assets and the market portfolio.
Corollary 5.2. In equilibrium, the HCAPM price relation (5.2) can be expressed in
terms of returns as
Ea[˜ r] − rf1 = β[Ea(˜ rm) − rf], (5.5)
where
β = (β1,β2,··· ,βK)
T, βk =
cova(˜ rm, ˜ rk)
σ2
a(˜ rm)
, k = 1,··· ,K,
and the mean and variance/covariance of returns under the consensus belief Ba are
deﬁned similarly.
Proof. Based on the previous notations, we divide thoroughly pk,o on both sides of
(5.3), then
[Ea(˜ rk)+1]−[rf+1] =
Wmoσ( ˜ Wm, ˜ xk)
pkoσ2
m
[(Ea(˜ rm)+1)−(rf+1)], k = 1,2,··· ,K.
That is,









cova(˜ xk/pk,o, ˜ Wm/Wm,o)
V ara( ˜ Wm/Wm,o)
=





The equilibrium relation (5.5) is the standard CAPM except that the mean and vari-
ance/covariance are calculated based on the consensus belief Ba.
6. THE CASE OF TWO RISKY ASSETS AND TWO BELIEFS
In this section, we illustrate the different impact of heterogeneity on the equilibrium
optimal demands (of heterogeneous agents), returns of risky assets and market portfo-
lio and the corresponding beta’s of risky assets, by considering a simple market with
two risky assets and one risk-free asset. We assume that there are two agents who may
have different beliefs.
To facilitate our analysis, we recall the connection between asset payoffs and asset
returns. For asset j (j = 1,2), the rate of return ˜ rj and the payoff ˜ xj are related by
˜ xj = xjo(1 + ˜ rj), where xjo > 0 is a constant. For i,j = 1,2, set
 i,j = Ei(˜ rj), ¯ σ
2





yi,j = Ei(˜ xj) = xj,o(1 +  i,j), σi,j = xj,o¯ σi,j,
and


















, i = 1,2.
As a benchmark, we consider the corresponding homogeneous case where
 1 =  i,1,  2 =  i,2, ¯ σ1 = σi,1, ¯ σ2 = σi,2, ¯ ρ = ρi (6.1)
for i = 1,2. Let rj = Ea(˜ rj),rm = Ea(˜ rm) be the equilibrium return of asset j(j =
1,2) and market portfolio respectively, and rf be the risk-free rate.
To explore the different impact of agent heterogeneity on the equilibrium portfolio
of agents and market equilibrium returns of the risky assets, the market portfolio and
the betas, we consider the following six cases.
6.1. Case1. Weﬁrst considerthe homogenous caseand examine the impact of chang-
ing the absolute risk aversion coefﬁcient, the mean, variance, and the correlation co-
efﬁcient on the optimal demands (of investors), the equilibrium returns and the corre-
sponding betas of the risky assets. The following Proposition 6.1 on the homogeneous
agent case is helpful in understanding the impact of different aspects of heterogeneity
in the subsequent cases.
Proposition 6.1. For a market with two risky assets and one risk-free asset, if agents
are homogeneous (with respect to the risk aversion coefﬁcient θ, the expected payoffs
y = (y1,y2), and the variance and covariance structure ρ,σ1,σ2, then
(i) the equilibrium demand of investor i is an equal share of the market portfolio
z∗
i = zm/2;14 CHIARELLA, DIECI AND HE













< (>,=)0 iff σ1 + ρσ2 > (<,=)0;
(iii) in terms of the volatility of the 1st risky asset (σ1), we have
∂r1
∂σ1






























(iv) in terms of the risk aversion coefﬁcient (θ), we have
∂r1
∂θ
> 0 iff σ1 > −ρσ2;
∂r2
∂θ









< 0 iff r2W
2
m,o < rm;
































Proof. See Appendix A. ￿
When agents are homogeneous, the result in Proposition 6.1(i) is very intuitive.
Changing mean and variance/covariance does not change the equilibrium demands for
risky assets. This simply illustrates the no-trad theorem in the homogeneous and rep-
resentative agent literature. Propositions 6.1(ii)-(v) indicate that changes in expected
payoff, variance, correlation coefﬁcient and the risk aversion coefﬁcient have different
impacts on equilibrium returns and beta coefﬁcients of the risky assets. To illustrate
these impacts, we choose
 1 = 0.1, 2 = 0.12, ¯ σ1 = 0.12, ¯ σ2 = 0.15, ¯ ρ = 0.5,rf = 0.05,θ = 1,xj,o = 10.
(6.2)
Hence
y1 = 11,y2 = 11.2,σ1 = 1.2,σ2 = 1.5,ρ = 0.5. (6.3)
Assume that the initial endowment of the two risky assets are 0.5 and 0.5, respectively
for both investors. This leads to a market portfolio of one share for both risky assets.
These are the parameters we will use in our following discussion on various cases
unless stated otherwise. The discussions are illustrated by using various ﬁgures, in
which the blue (or dark) surface corresponds to asset-1 and the green (or grey) surface
corresponds to asset-2.AGGREGATION OF HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS AND ASSET PRICING THEORY 15
Proposition 6.1 is illustrated in Figure 6.1. Proposition 6.1 (ii) shows that, an in-
crease of the expected payoff of asset-1 doesn’t change the equilibrium return of asset-
2, but increases the beta coefﬁcient for asset-2, and correspondingly the expected re-
turn of the market portfolio decreases. Also, an increase of expected payoff of asset-1
decreases (increases) the equilibrium return and the beta coefﬁcient of asset-1 when
σ1 + ρσ2 > 0(< 0). A similar argument can be used for the case when the expected
payoff of asset-2 changes. This result is illustrated in Figure 6.1 panels (A3) and (B3)
3.
The impact of changing variance on the equilibrium returns and betas is more com-
plicated. Assume that both asset payoffs are positively correlated. From Proposition
6.1 (iii), the equilibrium returns for both assets increase as the volatility of asset-1 in-
creases. Also, the beta coefﬁcient increases for asset-1 but decreases for asset-2. This
is illustrated in Figure 6.1 panels (A2) and (B2). For ﬁxed σ2, a high volatility in σ1 is
associated with high return for asset-1 while the return for asset-2 is almost unchanged.
Figure 6.1 (B2) demonstrates that changing volatility (and hence the covariance) has a
signiﬁcant impact on beta coefﬁcients of the risky assets.
Figure 6.1 panels (A1) and (B1) illustrate the equilibrium returns (r1,r2) and β
coefﬁcients of the risky assets for changing absolute risk aversion (CARA) coefﬁcient
θ and correlation coefﬁcient ρ. It is found that r1 < r2 and β1 < 1 < β2. With respect
to the risk aversion coefﬁcient, one can see from Figure 6.1 panels (A1) and (B1) that,
as investors become more risk averse, returns of the risky assets increase signiﬁcantly
and the beta coefﬁcient of the ﬁrst risky assets decreases while the beta coefﬁcient of
the second risky assets increases. Also, it follows from Proposition 6.1 (iv) that, for the
given σi(i = 1,2), if ρ < −σ1/σ2(= −0.8), the return of the ﬁrst asset will decrease
as agents become more risk averse. Hence one of the asset returns may decrease when
two risky assets are highly negatively correlated.
From Proposition 6.1 (v), one can see that an increase in correlation of asset payoffs
improves the returns of the risky assets and the market portfolio. This is clearly indi-
cated in Figure 6.1 panel (A1). More interestingly, Figure 6.1 panels (A1) and (B1)
indicate that the correlation coefﬁcient ρ plays a less signiﬁcant role in determining
the equilibrium return but a more signiﬁcant role in determining the β of the assets.
On the other hand, the risk aversion coefﬁcient has a more signiﬁcant impact on the
equilibrium return but a less signiﬁcant impact on the β of the assets.
Based on the above analysis, one can see that the equilibrium returns of the risky
assets are strongly inﬂuenced by the change of the CARA coefﬁcient, followed by the
standard deviation, the correlation coefﬁcient, and the expected payoff of the assets.
As far as the beta coefﬁcients are concerned, they are mostly inﬂuenced by changes of
the correlation coefﬁcient, followed by the standard deviation, the CARA coefﬁcient
and the expected payoff of the assets. Overall, both the returns and beta coefﬁcients
are strongly inﬂuenced by changes in the standard deviation and weakly inﬂuenced by
changes in the expected payoff of the assets. This observation underlines the signiﬁ-
cant impact of heterogeneity in the variance/covariance to be discussed below.
We now consider various aspects of heterogeneity among the two agents and ex-
amine the impacts of these heterogeneities on the equilibrium demands in the optimal
portfolio of investors, the equilibrium returns of risky assets and the market portfolio,
and the corresponding β coefﬁcients for the risky assets.
6.2. Case 2. First, we assume that agents are homogeneous except for having hetero-
geneous beliefs about the correlation coefﬁcients of the risky assets ρ1 and ρ2. Figure
6.2 panels (a2), (b2) and (c2) illustrate the impact on the equilibrium demands for
3In all the ﬁgures, the expected return µi,j, rather than the expected payoff yi,j, is used for convenience.
Since dyi,j/dµi,j > 0, this replacement does not change the results.16 CHIARELLA, DIECI AND HE
the risky assets (z11,z12) for investor-1, the equilibrium returns of risky assets (r1,r2),
and the corresponding beta coefﬁcients (βi,i = 1,2), respectively. Unlike Case 1, the
optimal demand for risky asset-j of agent 1 satisﬁes
∂z1i
∂ρ1
< 0, i = 1,2.
Intuitively, because of r1 < r2, the optimal demand of investor-1 for asset 1 (asset 2)
is lower (higher) when the asset returns are highly correlated. It is also found that










< 0 (i = 1,2).
The impact of heterogeneous risk aversion coefﬁcients is illustrated in Figure 6.2
panels (a1), (b1) and (c1). We observe very similar features to the homogeneous case
except that the optimal demands of the investors change dramatically.
6.3. Case 3. We now consider the case in which two agents are heterogeneous in their
expected payoffs of the risky assets but homogeneous in their variance/covariance be-
liefs. For ﬁxed expected payoff for agent-2, the impact of the heterogeneous expected
payoffs of agent-1 is illustrated in Figure panels 6.3 (a3), (b3) and (c3). The optimal
demand of agent-1 changes as his/her expected payoffs change. Intuitively, agent-1
optimally holds less (more) share of the asset with lower (higher) expected return.
For agent-1, given an expected return of asset-2, as his/her expected return of asset-1
increases, the equilibrium return of asset-1 decreases slightly while the equilibrium
return of asset-2 does not change. Correspondingly, β1 < 1 < β2. We observe that
changing heterogeneous expected returns has a signiﬁcant impact on the optimal de-
mands of investors, but has an insigniﬁcant effect on the equilibrium returns and beta
coefﬁcients.
6.4. Case4. WenowaddonemoredimensiontothediscussioninCase3byassuming
that agents can have different beliefs on the correlation coefﬁcients of the two risky
asset returns, for example, (ρ1,ρ2) = (0,0) and (−0.5,0.5). It is found that there is no
signiﬁcant difference from what we have observed in Case 3, except lower or negative
correlation among two assets reduces the overall returns of the risky assets.
Based on the above two cases, we have found that, with respect to the equilibrium
returns and the betas of risky assets, heterogeneous beliefs in mean and correlation
structure do not generate much difference from the benchmark homogeneous case.
However, such heterogeneity leads to signiﬁcant changes in agents’ optimal portfolio
positions, which may contribute to high trading volumes in the market.
6.5. Case 5. In this case we assume that agents have heterogeneous beliefs about the
variance of asset returns but have homogeneous beliefs about the expected returns.

















Forﬁxed ¯ σ12, thereexistsa ¯ σ∗
11 = ¯ σ∗
11(¯ σ12)(infact ¯ σ∗
11 ≈ 0.114and0.214for ¯ σ12 = 0.1
and 0.15, respectively) such that
∂¯ σ∗
11
∂¯ σ12 > 0,




r1 < rm < r2, β1 < 1 < β2 for ¯ σ11 < ¯ σ
∗
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r1 > rm > r2, β1 > 1 > β2 for ¯ σ11 > ¯ σ
∗
11
Similar features are also found for various combinations of (ρ1,ρ2), such as (ρ1,ρ2) =
(0,0),(−0.5,−0.5), except that the levels of returns increase as ρ = ρ1 = ρ2 increases.
This feature is also found in the homogeneous case.
6.6. Case 6. We now assume that agents have heterogeneous beliefs about both ex-
pected returns and variance/covariance. Calculations (not reported here) show that
there is no signiﬁcant difference for the equilibrium returns and betas compared to
Case 5.
Based on the discussion in Cases 5 and 6, we can see that heterogeneity in vari-
ance/covariance has a signiﬁcant impact on agents’ equilibrium demands of the risky
assets, equilibrium returns and beta coefﬁcients of the risky assets, in particular, for
volatility ¯ σ11 near the critical value ¯ σ∗
11. For example, for ﬁxed ¯ σ12 = 0.1, ¯ σ21 =
0.12, ¯ σ22 = 0.15 and ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.5, the following table shows the impact of different
subjective volatilities of agent-1 on asset-1. A 2% difference of agent-1’s subjective
volatility ¯ σ11 on the ﬁrst risky asset generates an excess return of 1.7% for the ﬁrst
risky asset, 0.2% for the second asset and 1% for the market portfolio. It also gener-
ates a signiﬁcant change for both beta coefﬁcients. The ﬁrst asset changes from the
least risky (with β1 = 0.945) to the most risky (with β = 1.018) while the changes are
other way around for the second asset. This simple example suggests that a higher risk
premium of a risky asset may be due to the heterogeneous beliefs about variance and
covariance among the agents.
¯ σ11 r1 r2 rm β1 β2
0.10 0.144 0.155 0.149 0.945 1.055
0.12 0.161 0.157 0.159 1.018 0.982
TABLE 6.1. Impact of heterogeneity of σ11 for ﬁxed σ12 = 0.10.
7. CONCLUSION
This paper provides an aggregation procedure for the construction of a market con-
sensus belief from the heterogeneous beliefs of different investors. This allows us to
characterize the market equilibrium in the traditional mean-variance model under the
consensus belief. Various impacts of heterogeneity are discussed. In particular, the
impact of diversity of heterogeneous beliefs is examined. In principle, we show that
the market aggregation behavior is a weighted average of heterogeneous individual
behavior, a very intuitive result. These weights are proportional to the individual risk
tolerance and covariance matrix. For example, the market equilibrium price reﬂects a
weighted average of the individuals equilibrium prices under their beliefs. We have es-
tablished an equilibrium relation between the market aggregate expected payoff of the
risky assets and the market portfolio’s expected payoff, which leads to the CAPM-like
relationshipunderheterogeneousbeliefs. Ourresultalsoprovidesasimpleexplanation
for the empirical relation between cross-sectional volatility and expected returns.
This paper provides a simple framework for dealing with heterogeneous beliefs and
aggregation. The intuition and results obtained in this paper can be extended to a dy-
namic setting and this may help us to understand various types of market behaviors,
such as, long swings of the market price away from the fundamental price, market
booms and crashes, herding, volatility clustering, long-range dependence, the risk pre-
mium puzzle and the relation between cross-sectional volatility and expected returns
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FIGURE 6.1. Effect of homogeneous risk aversion, correlation coefﬁ-
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FIGURE 6.2. Effect of heterogeneous risk aversion (a1, b1, c1) and



























































FIGURE 6.3. Effect of heterogeneous expected return (a3, b3, c3) and
standard deviation (a4, b4, c4).AGGREGATION OF HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS AND ASSET PRICING THEORY 21
APPENDIX A. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6.1
In the homogeneous case, we have θi = θ,σij = σj,yij = yj,ρj = ρ for i,j = 1,2.
It followsthat Θ = θ, Wm = aT
mpo = p1o+p2o, σ2
m = σ2
1+σ2
2+2ρσ1σ2 andzi = zm/2.




− Θσ1(σ1 + ρσ2), p2o =
y2
Rf

















Note that ri = yi/pio − 1(i = 1,2). In the following, we illustrate just the proof of (ii)
since the rest of Proposition 6.1 follows similarly and hence is omitted.




















Note that rm =
y1+y2
p1o+p2o. Then using (A.2), we obtain




















∂y1 > 0 if and only if σ1 + ρσ2 > 0.
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